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or  the  economy,  1977  was  a  year 
of surprises.  As  the year opened, economic 
conditions were, at best, ambiguous. Real gross 
national  product  (GNP) growth  had  declined 
precipitously from  an 8.8 per cent annual rate 
in  1976's  first  quarter to a  mere 1.2  per  cent 
rate  in  the  final  quarter  of  the  year.  Other 
economic  data also appeared  to confirm  this 
weakness.  Then  the  coldest  winter  in  recent 
history struck the nation.  Massive layoffs  and 
plant  slowdowns  occurred  and  crops  were 
damaged  by  freezing  and  drought  in  various 
parts  of  the  country.  Many  commentators 
viewed  these developments  as the  death  knell 
for  the  recovery.  But  the  economy's  strength 
had  been severely  understated by  the data for 
the fourth quarter of 1976 and the effects of the 
cold weather were also misunderstood. 
The marked slowing in  GNP growth during 
1976  was  due  entirely  to  a  downward 
adjustment  in  inventories  from  the  excessive 
levels in  the first half of 1976. Real final sales 
grew at a 6.3 per cent annual rate in the fourth 
quarter of 1976, almost twice the third quarter 
rate.  Likewise,  the effect  of  the  weather  was 
exaggerated.  Rather  than  representing  a 
permanent  slowdown,  the  impact  of  the 
weather was  more  like  that of  a  major strike, 
almost  solely  affecting the supply  side  rather 
than  the  demand  side  of  the  economy. 
Therefore, as the supply constraints eased  with 
the end of the bad weather, output rebounded 
and  the  economy  showed  its  strength  and 
resiliency.  Industrial  production,  retail  sales, 
and personal income, which had fallen sharply, 
surged  back  even  more.  Thus,  rather  than 
declining, real GNP in the first quarter of 1977 
grew at the rapid annual rate of  7.5  per cent, 
due in large part to inventory accumulation. 
The second  quarter of  1977 saw  real  GNP 
continue to grow at a rapid annual rate, 6.2 per 
cent,  down  slightly  from  the  first  quarter. 
However,  the  composition  of  GNP  growth 
changed. Final sales, which had grown at a 3.8 
per cent rate in the first quarter, accelerated to 
a 5.1  per cent annual rate, while the pace of 
inventory  accumulation  slowed.  Whereas 
inventory  growth  contributed  almost  50  per 
cent of  the first quarter growth  in  real  GNP, 
this proportion fell to only 18 per cent in  the 
second  quarter.  Although  the  growth  in 
personal consumption expenditures slowed 
down as the personal saving rate rose sharply, 
much  of  the decline  was  offset  by  residential 
construction  and  government  purchases  of 
goods  and  services,  with  the  latter  showing 
significant  gains  for  the  first  time  since 
mid-1975. 
Moving  into the  third  quarter,  however,  it 
became  increasingly evident  that the economy 
was again slowing down, as it had in the same 
quarter of  1976.  In  May,  June, and  July,  the 
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index  of  leading  economic  indicators  was 
reported  as  having  fallen  for  3  consecutive 
months. Though this was later revised to only 
small declines in May and June, other data also 
pointed to weakness:  third quarter  GNP data 
showed that real GNP grew at only a  4.7  per 
cent  annual  rate,  inventories  were  essentially 
flat  over  the  quarter,  and  final  sales  also 
slowed, to a 4.1 per cent rate. The only strong 
sector, in fact, was government spending. 
While  the  growth  rate  of  real  GNP  did 
decline  over  the  first  3  quarters  of  1977, 
substantial  strength  still  remains  in  the 
business  expansion.  An  examination  of 
the  expected  developments  in  the  major 
sectors  of  the  economy,  and  the  state  of  the 
pressures on the capacity to produce, supports 
this view. 
THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 4998 
One of the oft-cited reasons for believing the 
present  recovery  will  soon  end  is  that  its 
duration to date-32  months in  November-is 
just  short of  the  36-month  average  length  of 
other postwar expansions.'  However, duration 
is a poor measure of  the potential longevity of 
the present cycle. One reason is that the range 
of prior expansion periods is  broad enough to 
obscure  the  meaning  of  the "average" 
expansion.  Most  importantly,  however,  the 
elapsed duration of the recovery has little to do 
with  its  potential  longevity.  Instead,  it  is  the 
extent  to  which  output  growth  is  putting 
pressure  on  the  capacity  to  produce  which 
determines how long and how fast the economy 
can grow. 
The  transition  from  recovery  to  recession 
typically takes  place  after  the economy's 
resources-labor ,  materials,  and  plant  and 
equipment-are  so  fully  utilized  that 
bottlenecks  develop  and  any  further  demand 
I  Actually,  the frequently  cited  36-month  figure  is 
misleading  in  that it  excludes the long  expansion  of  the 
1960's. Including this period, the average recovery lasted 48 
months. 
increases  are largely  translated  into inflation. 
The slowdown in real economic growth  due to 
physical  limitations  in  the  economy,  coupled 
with inflationary distortions and resulting 
tightness in economic  policy, typically tend to 
bring recovery to a halt. 
Such  developments  are not  yet occurring  in 
the  present  recovery.  In  October,  capacity 
utilization  in  manufacturing  was  at 82.8  per 
cent,  the  approximate  level  maintained  since 
May,  and  several  points  below  the  tight 
conditions  last  existing  in  1973.  Similarly, 
large numbers of workers are unemployed, the 
unemployment  rate remains  near  7  per  cent, 
and  widespread  shortages of  skilled  labor  are 
not yet obvious. 
One  excellent  measure of  the  pressures  on 
capacity is the ratio of  the index of  coincident 
indicators  to the index  of  lagging  indicators. 
The  first  of  these  series  tends  to  move  with 
business  activity  while  the  second,  consisting 
mostly of  business  costs,  tends  to  lag.  Their 
ratio  shows  whether  the  factors  restraining 
recovery (rising costs in the lagging index) are 
increasing more  rapidly than  business  activity 
itself.  When  the  ratio  does  show  such  a 
relationship, it suggests the existence of cyclical 
strains setting the stage for the next downturn. 
This  ratio  index  is  thus  a  leading  indicator 
which has peaked well before the actual leading 
index in' the last  two  cycles  and  has  declined 
decisively  an  average  of  almost  20  months 
before earlier recessions. Though this index has 
been  falling since  May  1977,  the decline  has 
been slight, suggesting many  more  months  of 
continued expansion. Furthermore, the lagging 
index, which  has risen  only  slightly,  remains 
well  below  the  previous  peak, and  no  postwar 
recession  has  occurred  without  the  previous 
peak in this index being substantially exceeded. 
The absence of these pressures on capacity is 
2 The capacity  utilization  index  has  seldom  gone  higher 
than 90 per cent. The highest  recent  level  was 88 per cent 
in  1973,  but  intlationary  demand  pressures  apparently 
started developing when the index was near 86 per cent. 
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explained  by  the relative severity of  the recent 
recession.  This  severity  can  be  illustrated  by 
comparing the  level  of  various  economic 
measures reached in the third quarter of  1977 
with the previous cycle  peak  (November  1973) 
and  cyclical  trough  (March  1975),  and 
contrasting  those  changes  with  the  average 
experience  in  the five  pos'twar  business cycles 
from  November  1948  to November  1973.  For 
example, real GNP declined about 6 per cent in 
the latest recession and then rose about 15 per 
cent through the third quarter of 1977. The net 
result of the changes was a level of GNP about 
8 per cent higher than the previous peak.  Over 
the other postwar cycles, however, the average 
recessionary decline was less than 2  per  cent, 
the average recovery to the next peak was about 
23 per cent, and the average  increase in GNP 
from peak to peak was about 21 per cent. 
The relatively small improvement in the third 
quarter data from the 1973 peak is observed in 
virtually  every  GNP  series.  The contrast 
with  prior  recoveries,  however,  is  most 
dramatic  in  the series  on  real  business  fixed 
investment  in  structures.  The  recent 
recessionary decline in  investment in structures 
was  about  19  per  cent,  compared  with  an 
average  postwar  decline  of  about  2  per  cent. 
The recent recovery, however, was  far smaller 
than average, 4 per cent versus 23 per cent. As 
a result, the third quarter level of investment in 
structures  was  about  15  per  cent  below  the 
previous peak, while the average experience has 
been  a  peak-to-peak increase of  about 21  per 
cent. 
The  strength  of  the  continuing  recovery 
depends, of course, on its various components, 
and  the  outlook  for  these  sectors  varies 
considerably.  Growth in  real  GNP consists  of 
the  change  in  inventory  investment  and  the 
change in final sales.  The main reason for the 
irregular growth in GNP since the recession has 
been  unusually  large fluctuations  in  inventory 
investment.  Inventory  liquidation  was  respon- 
sible  for  almost  halting  GNP  growth  in  the 
fourth  quarter  of  1976.  Because  inventory 
accumulation  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
nearly as excessive during the first half of  1977 
as  in  1976,  a  large  correction  now  seems 
unlikely.  A  minor correction or  no change in 
inventory investment  seems  most probable. In 
part  because  businessmen  appear  to  have 
become  more  cautious  and  knowledgeable  in 
inventory management, inventories during 1978 
should grow at about the same rate as business 
sales. 
Business sales depend most strongly upon the 
behavior of  personal  consumption expen- 
ditures,  which  make  up  about  two-thirds  of 
GNP.  Consumer  spending  in  the second  and 
third quarters of  1977 was restricted  partly by 
an increase in the saving rate, and especially, in 
the third quarter, by a slowdown in the growth 
in  personal  income.  The  income  slowdown 
partly  reflected  both  slower  growth  in 
employment and a fall in average hours worked 
during the third quarter. Because employment 
growth  may  now  have  recovered  and  average 
hours worked are more likely to rise than fall, it 
appears  that  personal  income  may  resume  a 
more rapid rise. Along with a flattening in the 
personal  saving  rate,  this  should  stimulate 
some  improvement  in consumer spending 
throughout  1978,  above  the  rate  of  the 
second  and third quarters of  1977 but  not  as 
rapid as in the first quarter of the year. 
Strength  in  the economy  must  come  from 
other  sectors  as  well.  The  two  most  likely 
candidates for this strength are business fixed 
investment  and government spending. The lag 
in business fixed investment has been primarily 
responsible  for  the relatively small increase in 
output  from  the  prior  peak,  and  continued 
economic  growth  depends  critically  upon  the 
future  strength  of  this  sector.'  Signs  of  a 
recovery in this sector first appeared in the first 
quarter of  1977,  but were entirely  in  business 
equipment, primarily in  purchases of  cars and 
3 On  average, 10  quarters after their  respective  recession 
troughs, earlier postwar recoveries exceeded their previous 
peaks in real GNP  by 12.5 per cent. This compares with an 
increase of 8.3 per cent in  the current recovery. 
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trucks. Total business fixed investment slowed 
in the second quarter, despite a major increase 
in  investment  in  structures,  and  then  slowed 
further in the third quarter as both structures 
and  equipment  investment  grew  only 
moderately. 
There are several indications,  however, that 
the desired  pickup  may,  in  fact,  take  place. 
New  orders for nondefense capital goods  rose 
sharply in August and September after a deep 
July decline.  Contract  awards  for  commercial 
and  industrial  buildings  now  appear  to  have 
begun  their  long-awaited  recovery.  Capital 
appropriations  rose  4  per cent  in  the second 
quarter following a 2 per cent gain in the first 
quarter and a  21  per  cent  rise  at the end  of 
1976. Unspent backlogs of appropriations have 
reached  record  levels.  Finally,  machine-tool 
orders  are  healthy  once  again  and  backlogs 
have been climbing steadily. 
Two other indications of  a pending recovery 
in  capital investment  are the current level  of 
capacity  utilization  and  corporate  cash  flow. 
Though the level of capacity utilization is below 
the  bottleneck  range  of  1973,  it  is  near  the 
point  where  a  number  of  industries  must 
expand  their investment  in  order  to maintain 
efficient  production.  Similarly,  the  ability  of 
corporations  to finance  investment  from  their 
gross savings has improved  markedly in recent 
quarters.  Gross  savings  of  nonfinancial 
corporations were 83 per cent of investment in 
plant and equipment from 1968-72  but fell to 
only  64  per  cent  in  1974  as  gross  savings 
pl~mmeted.~  Though  retained  earnings  still 
remain  relatively  low,  a  substantial  improve- 
ment  has occurred  so that in  the first  half  of 
1977  nonfinancial  corporations  were  able  to 
finance 95 per cent of their investment through 
their after-tax cash flow. 
Gross savings of nonfinancial corporations are calculated 
as the sum of retained earnings on a national  income and 
products  account  (NIPA) basis  and  capital  consumption 
allowances with adjustments.  Retained earnings (NIPA) are 
corporate  profits  with  inventory  valuation  and  capital 
consumption adjustments minus corporate tax liability and 
dividends. 
The residential construction picture is mixed. 
The small third  quarter decline in  residential 
expenditures  was  disappointing  following  the 
strong second  quarter showing.  This  was 
especially true in light of the rapid pace of third 
quarter  housing starts which  exceeded  a 
2-million-unit  annual  rate, almost  8  per  cent 
above the second  quarter.  Because  there  is  a 
lag  between  new  starts  and  GNP-measured 
investment,  the  near-term  future  may  again 
show a rise in this sector. However, starts are at 
a  very  high  rate  which  is  unlikely  to  be 
exceeded  in  1978.  Because  of  this,  the 
contribution  of  the  residential  construction 
sector in  1978  GNP  growth  will  probably  be 
relatively moderate. 
The economic recovery in the United States, 
though less above its earlier peak  than at the 
same  stage  in  prior  postwar  recoveries,  has 
been  stronger  than  that  in  other  countries. 
Because of this relative strength and because of 
the  tremendous  increase  in  oil  imports,  net 
exports of  goods and services were  a  negative 
factor  in  real  GNP  growth  from  the  third 
quarter of  1976 through the second quarter of 
1977. This drag on the economy was reversed to 
a small gain in the third quarter. Nevertheless, 
the  foreign  sector  is  not  likely  to  make  a 
significant contribution to GNP growth  until a 
better  recovery  is  achieved  by  U.S.  trading 
partners. 
Government purchases of goods and services 
provided a strong boost to the economy in  the 
second  and  third  quarters  of  1977  following 
almost  2  years  of  stagnation.  Although 
purchases by  state and local governments rose 
at over  a  6  per  cent  annual  rate  in  these  2 
quarters,  their  budgets  remain  sharply  in 
surplus.. Given these surpluses, a  high  level  of 
borrowing, and large Federal transfer payments 
for  public  employment  and  other  programs, 
spending  by  these  governments  will  likely 
contribute significantly to GNP growth in 1978. 
Similarly, the Federal Government is projecting 
a  substantial  increase  in  its  deficit  for  fiscal 
year  1978 over fiscal  year  1977. The over  $13 
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billion  deficit  increase  is  due  to  a  projected 
expansion  of outlays rather than to a shortfall 
in  receipts  and,  therefore,  represents 
substantially  greater  economic  stimulus  than 
that  provided  by  the  1977  budget.  Further 
stimulus will be provided should a reduction in 
personal and  business taxes  be  introduced  in 
1978. 
The outlook  for  the individual  sectors 
suggests  that  the  economy  will  continue  to 
grow  at  a  moderate  rate,  perhaps  between  4 
per cent and 5 per cent in real GNP from  the 
end  of  1977  to  the  end  of  1978.  However, 
whereas  personal  consumption  expenditures, 
inventory changes, and residential construction 
alternated  in  providing the impetus for expan- 
sion  in  most  of  the quarters since the trough, 
government  purchases  and  business fixed 
investment should  play a larger role in  1978. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESOURCE 
USE AND INFhAPlON 
In  the  first  year  of  recovery,  from  the 
recession's trough in the first quarter of  1975 to 
the  first  quarter of  1976, employment  in  the 
economy grew 2.5 per cent. In the year  to the 
first  quarter  of  1977,  employment  growth 
accelerated to 2.9 per cent. It then experienced 
its fastest growth in the second quarter of 1977, 
at a 6.3  per cent annual rate, before falling to a 
2.0 per cent annual rate in  the third quarter. 
Despite  the  rapid  employment  gains 
experienced  in  this recovery, which raised  the 
employment-population ratio to just short of  its 
all-time  high, the almost equally  large  growth 
in  the  civilian  labor  force  left  the  overall 
unemployment  rate at 7.0 per cent in  the third 
quarter of  1977. The  unemployment  rate was 
thus only  1.1 percentage points below  its  level 
at the trough in the first quarter of  1975, and 
was far higher than the 4.7 per cent level in the 
quarter  before  the  recession  began.  During 
1978,  the  unemployment  situation  can  be 
expected to continue to improve as employment 
grows  more  rapidly  than  the  civilian  labor 
force. One reason  is  the projected  doubling of 
public service employment outlays during fiscal 
1978. However, given only the moderate growth 
rate  expected  for  real  GNP,  the  overall 
unemployment  rate  is  likely  to  decline  only 
slightly by the end of 1978. 
The  underlying  rate  of  inflation  in  the 
economy is directly related to the growth in unit 
labor costs, the difference between the rate of 
increase in labor compensation and the rate of 
increase in labor productivity.  Even in the face 
of  high  unemployment  and  unused  capacity, 
labor  compensation  in  the  private  nonfarm 
economy has grown  very  rapidly  during both 
the recession and  the recovery.  Compensation 
increases  are  due  to  increasing  output  per 
worker  as  well  as  to  expanded  coverage  of 
escalator  clauses  in  collective  bargaining 
agreements,  and  to the incorporation  of  high 
inflationary expectations and high rates of past 
inflation  in  wage  demands.  The  average 
quarterly increase in hourly  compensation  was 
at an annual rate of 8.7 per cent from the first 
quarter of  1975 to the third  quarter of  1977, 
and at an 8.8  per cent rate  in  the first three 
quarters of  1977. Productivity  increases  in the 
same two  periods,  however, averaged  only 3.5 
per cent  and  2.8  per  cent,  respectively.  As  a 
result, unit labor costs increased at a quarterly 
average  annual  rate  of  5.2  per  cent  over  the 
longer period and 5.9 per cent in 1977. Overall 
prices in the economy have tended to move in 
tandem. The GNP implicit  price deflator, the 
broadest  measure  of  domestic  price  changes, 
grew over the two periods at quarterly average 
rates of 6.0 per cent and 5.8 per cent. 
Increases  in  the  consumer  price  index, 
another  measure  of  inflation,  have  recently 
moderated from the very high rates observed in 
the first  half  of  the year.  Fluctuations in  this 
series due to food and energy price changes are 
likely to continue. Nevertheless, the underlying 
rate of inflation continues to be determined  by 
movements in  unit  labor costs.  If  productivity 
increases over the next  year  continue to occur 
at about a 3 per cent rate, the rate of  inflation 
will  be determined largely by changes in  labor 
Monthly Review  0  December 1977 The Business and Financial Outlook for 1978 
compensation-the sum of wages, benefits, and 
employers'  contributions  to  social  insurance 
programs. 
Increases  in  the  wage  component  of  labor 
compensation have recently accelerated.  In the 
unionized  sector of  the economy,  the effective 
level  of  wage  increases-prorated  over  all 
workers  in  major  collective  bargaining 
settlements-was at an annual rate of  8.9 per 
cent in the first  9 months of 1977,  contrasted 
with an 8.1 per cent  rate during all  of  1976. 
Similarly,  for  all  nonsupervisory  workers  in 
private nonagricultural industries, the adjusted 
average hourly earnings index rose at an annual 
rate of 7.9 per cent in the first 10 months of the 
year,  compared  with a  7.1 per cent  rise from 
December  1975  to  December  1976.  During 
1978, wages  might  have been  expected  to rise 
about 8.5 per cent. However, the overall growth 
rate of wages will tend to be increased by the 15 
per cent increase in minimum wages which goes 
into effect on January 1, 1978.  The growth in 
total  labor  compensation  will  be  further 
exacerbated  by  large  legislated  increases  in 
unemployment insurance taxes and Social 
Security  contributions.  Because  of  these 
programs,  the  rate  of  increase  in  labor 
compensation  may  be  raised  by  about  1 
percentage  point.  In  addition,  the  new 
agricultural  assistance  program  will  also 
contribute  to  inflationary  problems.  As  a 
result,  there  seems  little  likelihood  that  the 
current  high  rate  of  inflation  will  soon  be 
significantly  reduced.  Instead,  given  a 
low-to-moderate growth  rate of  real GNP, the 
underlying  rate of  inflation  in  1978  may  be 
increased by about 1 percentage point because 
of the increased costs described above. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
AND OUTLOOK 
Economic  expansion  requires  financial 
expansion,  as  households,  firms,  and 
governmental  units  borrow  to  help  finance 
increased  purchases.  During economic  expan- 
sion,  the demand for  funds in  credit  markets 
frequently rises more rapidly than the supply of 
funds. Thus, interest  rates frequently increase 
as short-term rates did in 1977. 
This section discusses the behavior of interest 
rates during 1977,  as well  as  the demand  for 
and  supply  of  credit.  It  then  looks  at 
prospective  developments  for  1978,  and  at 
developments in the foreign exchange markets. 
Financial Developments in 1977 
Short-term interest  rates  were stable in  the 
first part of 1977, but have risen fairly rapidly 
since  the  end  of  April.  (See  Chart  1.)  For 
example,  the  interest  rate  on  3-month  U.S. 
Treasury bills averaged 4.54 per cent in April, 
but  rose  to  6.10  per  cent  in  November. 
Long-term  rates,  on  the  other  hand,  were 
relatively  stable  throughout  1977.  Average 
yields on  Aaa  corporate  bonds,  for  example, 
varied between 7.88 per cent and 8.12 per cent 
between January and  November, with both the 
high  and  low  occurring  in  the  first  three 
months of the year. 
The  behavior  of  interest  rates  in  1977 
contrasts  with  that  of  1975  and  1976  when 
interest rates generally declined.  However, the 
upward  movement in  short-term  interest  rates 
in  1977  conformed  to  the  more  common 
tendency  for  interest  rates  to  rise  during 
periods of economic expansion. In this respect, 
the marked stability of  long-term interest  rates 
during  the  year  is  somewhat  surprising.  It 
probably  reflects  a  reduction  in  inflationary 
expectations  during  1977,  an  occurrence  not 
usually part of an economic expansion. 
The 1977 rise in short-term interest rates was 
due in part to the large increase in the demand 
for funds during the year (Chart 2). During the 
first three quarters of  1977,  nonfinancial 
borrowers-households, nonfinancial busi- 
nesses,  governments,  and  foreigners-raised 
funds  at  an  annual  rate  of  $321  billion,  up 
sharply  from  the  record  $258  billion  level 
borrowed in  1976. 
The  U.S.  Government  contributed  signifi- 
cantly to the strong demand for funds in  1977, 
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Chart 1 
SELECTED INTEREST RATES, 1975-77 
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especially after midyear. The Government 
borrowed at an annual rate of $84 billion in the 
third quarter, up from $39 billion in the second 
quarter and  $41  billion in  the first quarter of 
1977. Household  borrowing  increased  in  1977 
as it  has throughout the  recovery, due to the 
financing of the high levels of home buying and 
consumer durable goods purchases. In the first 
three  quarters  of  1977,  household  borrowing 
was at an annual rate of $131 billion, compared 
with  $90  billion  in  1976.  Borrowing  by 
nonfinancial  business  also rose  in  1977,  with 
the first three  quarters  running  at an annual 
rate of  $98 billion.  up  from  $64  billion.  The 
increased borrowing by nonfinancial businesses 
was  the  result  of  the  increase  in  business 
investment  in  both  new  production  facilities 
and larger inventories. 
On the supply side,  all  major  suppliers  of 
funds to credit markets increased  their lending 
in  1977 (Chart  2).  The  largest source  of  new 
funds  in  1977,  as in  1976,  was  the  nation's 
depository  intermediaries-commercial  banks, 
savings and loan  associations,  mutual  savings 
banks,  and  credit  unions.  These  institutions 
lent new funds at an annual rate of $135 billion 
during the first three quarters of  1977, up from 
$125 billion in 1976. Depository intermediaries 
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were able  to sharply  expand  their  lending  in 
1977  because  their deposits  rose  rapidly, 
reflecting  rapid  growth  in  the  money  stock 
measures.'  During the year ending in the third 
quarter  of  1977,  MI,  the  narrowly  defined 
money stock, grew  at a  7.3  per cent  rate, M2 
increased at a 10.9 per cent rate, and M3 grew 
5  M1  is demand deposits of  commercial banks other than 
domestic  interbank  and  U.S.  Government  deposits,  less 
cash items in the process of collection, and Federal Reserve 
float; foreign demand balances at Federal  Reserve Banks; 
and currency outside the Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks. 
and vaults of  commercial banks.  M2 is M1 plus time and 
savings deposits of commercial banks other than negotiable 
certificates of  deposit of $100,000 or more of  large weekly 
reporting banks. M3 is M2  plus deposits of  mutual savings 
banks and savings and loan associations plus credit  union 
shares. 
at a 12.6 per cent rate. These growth  rates were 
somewhat  above  the  growth  rate  ranges  that 
had  been  projected  by  the  Federal  Open 
Market  Committee  (FOMC) for  this  period. 
The projected  ranges were 4.5 to 6.5 per cent 
for MI, 7.5 to 10.0 per cent for M2, and 9.0 to 
11.5 per cent for M3. 
The  rates  of  growth  of  the  monetary 
aggregates  accelerated  during  the  course  of 
1977. (See Chart 3.) MI grew at a 4.2 per cent 
annual rate in the first quarter, an 8.4 per cent 
rate in  the  second  quarter, and  at a  9.3 per 
cent rate in the third  quarter  of  the year.  M2 
increased  at an annual rate of  9.9  per cent  in 
the first  quarter, slowed  slightly  to a  9.2  per 
cent rate in  the second  quarter, and  increased 
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at a  10.3  per cent rate in  the third quarter. In 
response  to  the  rapid  growth  of  the  money 
stock,  the  Federal  Reserve  System  acted  to 
reduce  the  flow  of  reserves  to  the  banking 
system.  This  tended  to  reduce  the  supply  of 
funds  to  credit  markets  and  place  upward 
pressure on short-term  interest rates  beginning 
in  the second quarter of the year. 
The Financial Outlook 
Turning  to  prospective  developments, 
assuming moderate economic growth, the 
demand  for  funds  is  likely  to  show  only  a 
moderate increase in 1978.  It seems likely that 
the  level  of  Federal  borrowing  may  average 
somewhat  more  during  1978  than  in  1977. 
However, borrowing by households, which  has 
been  the  major  source  of  increased  credit 
demand throughout the economic  recovery, is 
likely to show  little,  if  any,  increase  in  1978. 
This  is  because  the  most  important  uses  of 
funds  borrowed  by  households  are to finance 
the purchase of  homes and automobiles.  Sales 
of both new homes and autos, which have been 
at very  high  levels  in  1977,  are  expected  by 
most analysts to show little increase in 1978. 
The extent of business demand for credit  in 
1978 will  depend  on  the degree  that business 
investment increases.  If, as expected, increases 
in  business  investment  continue  at  the 
moderate rates experienced  in  1977,  the 
demand  for  credit  by  businesses  will  be  only 
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moderately  strong.  A  full-fledged  investment 
boom. on the other  hand, would  lead  to very 
large  increases  in  the  demand  for  credit  by 
businesses. 
In  summary,  the  most  widely  accepted 
expectations  about  the  economy  imply  that 
increases in credit demand are likely to be more 
moderate  in  1978  than  in  1977.  However. 
unexpectedly strong demand from the business 
sector could develop in the unlikely event of an 
investment  boom.  Another  possible  source  of 
unexpectedly large demands for credit would be 
an  unexpectedly  large  Government  budget 
deficit  as a  result  of  larger  than expected  tax 
cuts or expenditure increases. 
On the supply side, one source  of  funds  to 
credit markets will  be the monetary expansion 
which  will  take  place  as the  Federal  Reserve 
continues  to  seek  growth  in  the  monetary 
aggregates.  For  the  period  from  the  third 
quarter of  1977  tnrough  the third  quarter  of 
1978, the FOMC projects that the growth  rate 
of Ml  will be between 4.0 and 6.5 per cent. M2 
is  projected  to grow  between  6.5  and  9.0  per 
cent, and  M3's  growth  rate is  projected  to be 
between  8.0 and 10.5 per cent.  These growth 
rates  are only  slightly  lower  than  the targets 
that have  been  in effect  during 1977, but are 
significantly  below  the  growth  which  actually 
occurred. Thus, the supply of funds to financial 
markets from  monetary expansion  is  likely  to 
be less in 1977 and 1978. 
Another  major source  of  funds to financial 
markets in 1978 will  be saving by  the private 
sector  with  the  amount  of  saving  determined 
primarily  by  the  level  of  income  in  the 
economy.  Since  it  is  generally  believed  that 
income  growth  will  be  somewhat  less  in  1978 
than  in  1977,  the supply  of  new  funds  from 
private savings is likely to be somewhat lower in 
1978 than in 1977. 
Thus, the outlook is for a somewhat smaller 
increase in the total of funds supplied to credit 
markets  in  1978  than  in  1977.  Since  the 
demand for funds is also likely to increase less 
in  1978 than in 1977, the smaller increase  in 
supply does not necessarily mean that financial 
markets  will  come  under  a  great  deal  of 
pressure  in  1978.  On the contrary.  it  appears 
that  there will  be  adequate  credit  to  finance 
continuing economic expansion without putting 
severe  pressures  on  the  credit  markets, 
provided an investment boom does not develop 
and  an  unexpectedly  large  increase  in  the 
Government's  budget deficit does not occur. 
Some observers have expressed concern that 
certain sectors, particularly housing, may 
experience credit stringency even  if  the overall 
supply  of  credit  is  adequate.  It  has  been 
suggested  that increases in  short-term interest 
rates  may  lead  to  disintermediation-that  is, 
the  movement  of  funds  out  of  financial 
intermediaries directly into credit  market 
instruments-which will  particularly  affect  the 
savings  and  loan  associations  (S&L's).  Since 
the  S&L's  are the  major  source  of  mortgage 
funds,  such  a  development  would  inevitably 
hurt the housing industry. 
However,  S&L's have become less vulnerable 
to  disintermediation  over  time.  Perhaps  the 
most  important  reason  for  reduced  vulner- 
ability  is  the  reduced  importance of  passbook 
savings accounts relative to certificate accounts 
as sources of funds. Approximately 60 per cent 
of  S&L  deposits  are  now  in  the  form  of 
certificate  accounts,  rather  than  in  passbook 
savings  accounts  which  can  be  withdrawn  on 
demand, a situation  which  clearly  reduces the 
sensitivity  of  the  S&L's  deposits  to  higher 
interest  rates.  In  addition,  S&L's  are  still 
relatively  liquid, and  have  drastically  reduced 
their borrowings from the Federal Home Loan 
Banks  (FHLB's). At  the end of  1974, 7.3 per 
cent of  S&L funds came from borrowings from 
the  FHLB's,  while  in  October  of  1977,  this 
ratio  stood  at  3.9  per  cent.  Thus,  there  is 
substantial  room  for  S&L's  to  increase  their 
borrowing  to  continue  mortgage  lending.  In 
addition,  in  recent  years,  S&L's  have  begun 
issuing mortgage-backed securities. The ability 
to issue these securities should  help to reduce 
the effects of  any disintermediation that does 
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develop since it  provides an alternative source 
of funds for mortgage lending. 
International Monetary Developments 
The  performance  of  the  dollar  in  forzign 
exchange markets was mixed during 1977. The 
dollar  declined  in  value  relative  to the 
currencies  of  a  number  of  other  major 
industrial  countries.  For  example,  a 
comparison  of  exchange  rates  at the  end  of 
1976  with  those  prevailing  in  mid-November 
1977  showed  the  dollar  down  19.4  per  cent 
relative  to  the  Japanese  yen,  11.1  per  cent 
relative to the Swiss franc, 6.9 per cent relative 
to the U.K.  pound, and 5.0 per cent relative to 
the  German  mark.  However,  the  U.S.  dollar 
was  up 8.9 per  cent  relative  to the Canadian 
dollar.  Since  Canada  is  our  most  important 
trading partner, trade-weighted  indexes
6  show 
Trade-weighted  indexes  of  the  value  of  the  dollar 
calculate the value of the dollar relative to a market basket 
of foreign currencies.  Each  currency  is  weighted  by  the 
amount of trade carried out between the country that issues 
it and the United States. 
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the dollar  with  relatively little  change  during 
1977 (Chart 4). 
A major reason for the decline in the dollar  . 
relative to the value of currencies of some other 
major  industrial  nations  has  been  the  large 
trade deficits incurred  by the United  States in 
1976  and  1977,  coupled  with  the  large 
surpluses  of  Germany  and  Japan.  The  U.S. 
trade  deficit  was  at  an  annual  rate  of  $30 
billion through the first three quarters of 1977. 
The size of the deficit is due primarily to large 
imports of foreign oil at high prices, and to the 
fact that the rate of economic growth has been 
quite  weak  in  many  of  our  major  export 
markets. 
Several factors  will  affect  the  value  of  the 
dollar relative  to other currencies  in  1978.  Of 
particular  importance  will  be  changes  in  the 
level of the U.S.  trade deficit. Unless there are 
major changes in the prices of U.S. exports (as 
would  happen  if  there  were  an  unexpected 
increase  in  foreign  demand  for  U.S. 
agricultural  products),  major  improvements in 
the U.S. trade deficit will depend on the health 
of  the  economies  of  major  U.S.  export 
.customers.  Increased  growth  in  these 
economies  would  greatly  assist  U.S.  exports 
and lead to increases in  the value of the dollar. 
On  the  other  hand,  an  unexpectedly  large 
increase  in  the  price  of  imported  oil  would 
weaken the U .S. trade position and the value of 
the dollar. 
The first  three  quarters  of  1977  were 
characterized  by  a  progressive slowing  of  the 
rate of economic growth and, beginning ,in the 
second  quarter,  by  increases  in  short:tekn 
interest  rates. This combination of  events  has 
led to some concern that the rate of  economic 
growth will be quite low  in 1978. 
This  article's  analysis  suggests  that  the 
economy will grow at a moderate rate in  1978. 
Continued  expansion  of  all  sectors  of  the 
economy can be expected.  However, growth in 
1978 is likely to be dependent primarily on the 
growth of business investment and Government 
expenditures rather than on the stimulus from 
the  consumer  sector  which  has  so  far 
characterized this economic recovery. 
The financial  sector  will  lik,ely  provide 
sufficient funds to finance  moderate economic 
growth  in  1978.  While  the supply of  credit  is 
expected  to grow  less  rapidly in  1978  than in 
1977, expected reductions in the growth of the 
demand  for  credit  are  likely  to  prevent  any 
severe shortage of funds from occurring. 
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